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Abstract
Empirical and theoretical studies show that the local provision of pub-
lic education a⁄ects the well being of individuals through two channels:
the ￿rst re￿ ects the direct use of the good, whereas the second runs
through the value of the housing. The second e⁄ect leans on the idea
that the quality of public education is capitalized into the value of the
own housing.
Empirical evidence ￿nds that in a multi-community model childless
households support local public spending in education because of the cap-
italization e⁄ect. I study the behavior of childless households, not neces-
sarily elderly, in a two community model and show that the capitalization
e⁄ect may not be a su¢ cient condition for middle aged households with-
out children to support local public spending in education by a majority
voting.
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11 Introduction
Empirical and theoretical studies show that the local provision of public educa-
tion a⁄ects the well being of individuals through two channels: the ￿rst re￿ ects
the direct use of the good, whereas the second runs through the value of the
housing. The second e⁄ect leans on the idea that the quality of public education
is capitalized into the value of the own housing.
In this paper I try to show whether, in a model where the local provision of
public education is ￿nanced by a tax on residents, the capitalization of public
education into the value of housing is a su¢ cient condition for childless house-
holds to support local taxation.
The pioneer in capitalization study is Oates (1969). He analyzes a 1960
sample of northern New Jersey communities and ￿nds that the value of housing
increases in the public expenditure in the school system. Sonstelie and Portney
(1980a and 1980b), Heinberg and Oates (1970), Orr (1968) and Hamilton (1979)
con￿rm Oates￿ s results of the capitalization of school quality and per pupil
expenditure into the value of the housing. It is also shown that a property tax
is the most e⁄ective channel the local public expenditure runs through. Yinger
et al. (1988) survey all the main papers dealing with the capitalization of a
property tax into the value of the housing.
A wide literature analyzes the capitalization e⁄ect within a framework where
the level of provision is decided by a voting system. This literature shows that
the capitalization e⁄ect may allow households to support local public spending
in education. Yinger (1981) shows that in multi-communty model the capi-
talization of a local tax into the housing values is a su¢ cient condition for the
median voter to support local public spending. Fischel (2001) invented the term
"homevoter" to represent the homeowners whose voting tends to maximize the
value of their housings. The main idea is that when the government allows the
residents to decide the tax by a majority voting, each voter internalizes the
capitalization of public education into the value of his housing, and then votes
for a positive tax.
I introduce the childless voters into a model where the local provision of
public education is ￿nanced by a tax decided in a majority voting.
Empirical evidence ￿nds that in a multi-community model childless house-
holds vote for a positive tax because of the capitalization e⁄ect. Benson and
O￿ Halloran (1987) ￿nd that childless voters in California support school spend-
ing because of its positive e⁄ect on their property￿ s value. Baldosn and Brunner
(2003) ￿nd that in California elderly generally vote to decreases the state spend-
ing but are much more willing to support local spending. Cutler et al. (1993),
Hoxby (1998), Goldin and Katz (1997, 1999), Alesina et al. (1999), Bergstrom
et al. (1982), Harris et al. (2001), Hilber and Mayer (2006) show that percent
of elderly may be associated with higher local school spending. However, all
these studies identify childless households only as elderly by abstracting from
any evaluation about the behavior of childless households whose members are
middle aged.
I study the behavior of childless households, not necessarily elderly, in a two
2community model and show that the capitalization e⁄ect may not be a su¢ cient
condition for middle aged households without children to vote for a positive tax.
A wide branch of urban economics literature deals with the local provision
of education by a majority voting. Tiebout (1956) is the ￿rst to theoretically
model an economy composed of many independent communities where public
good is provided by the local government by a local tax. Many studies at-
tempted to re￿ne Tiebout (1956) by introducing the local provision of public
education. Although these attempts strongly extend this literature in the last
decade, surprisingly the direct introduction of childless households in a theoret-
ical model is still missing. These studies abstract from childless voters and show
that households vote for a positive tax because they bene￿t from the educational
provision trough their school aged children1.
My results are in line with the theoretical model of Brueckner and Joo (1991).
They consider a model where households live in their community only for two
periods. The local government ￿nances the provision of public good with a
property tax. At the beginning of the ￿rst period, the residents are allowed
to vote on the level of public good, which remains ￿xed over the two periods.
Since all the households are assumed identical, this paper only deals with the
behavior of a representative voter by abstracting from the existence of the voting
equilibrium. When voting, the households forecast to leave the community in
the future. In this model households are more willing to vote for maximizing
the value of their housing the nearer is the date of their departure or the higher
is the probability of an early departure in presence of uncertainty about the
future.
Following Brueckner and Joo (1991) I allow the capitalization e⁄ect to run
through the sale of the housing, within a context in which public school is lo-
cally provided. Di⁄erently from Brueckner and Joo, I introduce the analysis of
the voting equilibrium. I consider a two period model analyzing a metropoli-
tan area composed of two communities whose boundaries are exogenously ￿xed.
The area is inhabited by a continuum of households both with and without a
child. The public education is provided by the local government through a tax
decided in a majority voting. In the ￿rst period households sort into communi-
ties and buy a housing in a competitive market. Once the allocation process is
ended, households can send their child, if any, only to the school belonging to
community where they live. At the end of the ￿rst period, households vote for
the tax. Since I assume that voting takes place only once, the tax remains ￿xed
over the two periods. In the second period with a certain probability households
must leave and resell their housing. New households come into the area, buy a
housing from the leaving households and sort into the communities. The new
residents can not modify the local provision of education. In this model the cap-
italization e⁄ect consists in the positive correlation between the reselling price
and the tax. The reselling price is higher the higher is the tax decided in the
￿rst period. In this framework childless households vote for a positive tax only
1Neychba (2003) stresses the necessity of introducing the childless households in a multi-
community model, but he also points out the complications arising from this re￿nement in
terms of voting equilibrium.
3for a su¢ ciently high probability of leaving and reselling their housing. The idea
is that the probability of reselling the housing could be considered as a weight
given to the capitalization e⁄ect. Only for a su¢ ciently high probability the
marginal bene￿t from the higher tax capitalized into the housing price allows
childless households to vote for a positive tax.
I extend the capitalization e⁄ect to a two-community theoretical model in
which the childless households are directly introduced. The aim of my paper is
to show whether the capitalization of the tax into the housing price is a su¢ cient
condition for the childless households to vote for a positive tax, by ruling out
any consideration on whether such a positive tax e⁄ectively maximizes the value
of the housing. Hence, my paper does not properly belongs to the literature (i.e.
Brueckner and Joo 1991, and Fischel, 2001) dealing with the maximization of
the housing value by a voting on the local public spending. My work can be
thought as a pioneering study attempting to stress the necessity of introducing
the voting behavior of the childless households in the standard urban economics
theoretical models in which the local tax is decided by a majority voting.
I extend the capitalization e⁄ect to a dynamic contest to better represent the
behavior of the middle aged households. The probability of changing location
may re￿ ect some labour market issues as labour mobility or turnover. The use
of such a probability may help to di⁄erentiate the childless households according
to the age of their members. The childless households whose members are young
may be identi￿ed by a high probability of changing location, whereas elderly are
supposed to be retired and in general less willing then youth to leave their own
housing. In this sense, my result shows that only for young childless households
the capitalization e⁄ect may be a su¢ cient condition to support a local public
spending in education.
2 The model
I consider a two periods (t = 1;2) model analyzing a metropolitan area divided
into 2 communities (a, b). The area is inhabited by a continuum of households
whose measure is normalized to 1. In the metropolitan area the boundaries and
land of the two community are exogenously determined. The amount of housings
is the same in each community and is denoted by H. Houses are homogenous
and each household consumes one unit of housing. This implies that H also
denotes the number of households living in each community. We assume that
H = 1n2, this means that housing capacity in both communities is just enough
to contain the population living in the metropolitan area. Households can move
between the two communities without mobility and residence costs.
In each community the local government imposes a tax to fund the provision
of education. This tax is decided by the residents in a majority voting.
The sequence of the events is illustrated in ￿g. 1: At the beginning of time
1, households vote on the tax and the child, if any, goes to school. The voting
takes place only at time 1, therefore tax remains ￿xed over the two periods.
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Fig. 4.1 The sequence of the events
They sell their current housing and go in another area. Once bought a housing
in the new area, these households send the child, if any, to school, consume and
die at the end of the period.
With probability (1 ￿ q) households stay put. They send their child to
school, consume and die at the end of the period.
At time 2, new residents move into the metropolitan area, buy a housing from
the leaving households and sort into communities. Without loss of generality
we assume that the measure of entering households is equal to 2(qH), this
means that housings supplied by leaving households are just enough to contain
all entering households. Since each households buy only one housing and the at
time 1 all the housings are inhabited, then qH represents both the fraction of
households leaving and entering one community. New residents send the child
if any, to school, consume and die at the end of the period. Since at time 2
voting does not take place, the new entrants cannot modify local provision of
education. In both periods, the housings price in each community is determined
in a competitive market.
The objective of this model is to show whether the capitalization of local
pubic education into the housing price is a su¢ cient condition for childless
households to vote for a positive tax.
3 Households




and whether or not they have a
child. In particular, we denote c and n respectively household with and without
5a child. We assume that income is distributed according to the density function
f (y): Households consume three goods: private good z, housing h and public
education per student E.
Public school is locally provided and each child is enrolled at the school be-
longing to the community where he is resident. The private good z is considered
as numeraire and its price is normalized to 1:
The inter-temporal utility function for households with a child at time 1 is
de￿ned as follows:
Uc (E;z;q) = v (z1) + E1 + (1 ￿ q)(v (z2) + E2) + qv (yc + p2) (1)
Housing does not appear in the utility function because households consume
just one unit of this and it is homogenous.
The ￿rst two terms denote the utility at time 1: the household with a child
consumes the numeraire z1 and receives the educational expenditure per student
E1. The third and fourth terms represent the expected utility at time 2. The
discount factor is normalized to 1: In the second period, with probability (1 ￿ q)
households stay put. Since they do not leave the community, their consumption
of numeraire is z2 and the provision of public education per student is E2. With
probability q, households must leave. They sell their housing at price p2 and
emigrate in another metropolitan area. Once in the new area, these households
buy a housing, pay the tax and send their child to school. Without loss of
generality, the gross of tax price and the public education per student in this
new area are normalized to zero. Therefore, the household￿ s utility in the new
area simply depends on the sum of second period income and the reselling price
p2: The household￿ s income is given by yc and it is assumed to remain the same
in both periods.
Utility function for household without a child is:
Un (z;q) = v (z1) + (1 ￿ q)v (z2) + qv (yn + p2) (2)
Households without a child do not receive public education, therefore utility
function 2 does not directly depend on E. The childless household￿ s income is
given by yn and, as for the households with a child, it is assumed to remain the
same in both periods.
The budget constraints at time 1 and 2 are the following:
z1 = yi ￿ p
j
1 (3)
z2 = yi ￿ Tj (4)
6where j = a;b, denotes the community, and yi, with i = c;n denotes the
income of the households with and without a child.
Constraint 3 gives the consumption of numeraire in the ￿rst periods. The




1 ￿ Tj. At
time 1, household pays net of tax housing price p
j
1 to buy housing in community
j. The local government imposes a tax Tj. In this period, households do not
save and the consumption of numeraire z1 is given by the di⁄erence between
income and gross of tax price. At time 2, the consumption of numeraire is given
by the di⁄erence between the second period income and the tax, as de￿ned in
constraint 4.
Let ￿ be the probability that entering household has no children. Therefore
the fraction of new childless residents is given by ￿2qN: The new residents come
from another metropolitan area and they live in community j just at time 2.
The utility function for new residents with a child is:
Uc (E;z) = v (z2) + E2 (5)
and for new residents without a child:
Un (z) = v (z2) (6)
Utility of new residents without a child depend on numeraire z only.
Entering households consider the local tax as a constant because they do
not vote. Each new resident pays Tj to ￿nance the educational expenditure per
student Ej.
All new residents face the following budget constraint:
z2 = y ￿ Tj ￿ p
j
2 (7)
They do not save, and all income they have left once bought housing and
paid the tax is used to consume z.
In the rest of the model we use the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Households utility function is linear in E and increasing in
all its arguments. v (zi) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly concave in
zi and v000 (zi) > 0; with i = 1;2:
Assumption 1 explains that the utility functions for all types of households
positively depend on numerarire and public education, but the marginal utility
with respect to z is decreasing. The positive third partial derivative of the
utility with respect to z is a technical assumption and determines our results
in a determinant way. This implies that the risk adversion of households is
increasing in the tax.
74 Local government and education production
In each community the local government imposes a tax to collect resources and
provide public education (E). In this model education is considered as a private
good and it is produced from the numeraire according to a constant returns
to scale technology with respect to the number of student and the quantity
provided.
















2 = TjN (9)
Constraint 9 and 10 respectively represent the budget constraint for the local
government at time 1 and at time 2. We assume that the government cannot
transfer resources between periods and that within each community households
receive the same educational expenditure per student.
N is the number of households living in each community. The assumption
that community a and b have the same capacity implies that the number of
residents is the same in each community. Since at time 2 each leaving household
sells its housing to one new resident, the number of leaving households is equal
to the number of entering ones. This implies that N remains ￿xed in both
periods. n
j
1 is the number of households with a child living in community j at
time 12, while E
j
i is the educational expenditure per student in community j at
time i.
The right hand side of 8 represents all the resources collected by the local
government to ￿nance the provision of public education in the ￿rst period. At
time 1, each household pays Tj, therefore the tax revenue is TjN. The total





At time 2; each household living in community j pays Tj for the provision
of E
j
2. In this period, the tax revenue in community j is TjNj. Since the
new residents leave tax just the way it is, the government collects the same tax
revenue in both periods. The total provision of education provided in community










2, where (1 ￿ q)n
j
1 is the number of
households with a child remaining in community j once the shock has occurred
and n
j




1 is exogenously given. It is possible to think that nature a time 1 decides the allocation
of households across the two communities. I use this assumption because the aim of this paper
is only to show whether the childless households support a local public spending in education
by a voting equilibrium, by abstracting from any housing market equilibrium at time 1:
85 The equilibrium of the model
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the model by solving it back-
wards. We start by the housing market at time 2 and solve the maximization
problems of the new residents. Then, we proceed by solving the maximization
problems of the residents at time 1.
5.1 Housing market and sorting into communities at time
2
At time 2; once the shock has occurred, the housing supply in community j is
equal to qH, i.e. the number of leaving households3. Each entering household
buys one unit of housing at price p
j
2. In this period, new residents choose
community given Tj and (1 ￿ q)n
j
1. For expositional convenience and without
loss of generality we assume Ta < Tb:
To characterize the housing market equilibrium at time 2 we need the net of
tax price p
j
2 paid by new residents to buy a housing. Since in each community
the housings market is competitive, the net of tax equilibrium prices are given by
the market clearing condition. We restrict the analysis to the case of ￿ > 1n24,
that is, the fraction of entering childless households is higher than the fraction
of the entering households with a child. Furthermore, we use the technical






N ; whose meaning will be clear in the next section.
At time 2, the housing supply function in community j is vertical at the
number of housings sold by leaving households; it is given by:
Sj = qH (10)
The housing demand is derived by solving the location problem of the new
residents.
Entering households take decision according to their indirect utility.






























3The housing supply is vertival at qH
4When ￿ > 1n2 we have qN < 2(￿qN); therefore the housings available in one community
at time 2 are not enough to allocate all entering childless households (whose measure is given
by 2(￿qN))
5Since U (E;z) is assumed to be continuously di⁄erentiable function, then V (:) has the
same properties.




2+Tj is the gross of tax price in the second period and
yc;yn denote the income respectively of households with and without a child. We










Entering households choose to live in the community in which their indirect
utility is maximized. Therefore their maximization problems are:
max
￿



























The allocation decisions of childless households at time 2 is explained in the
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 New childless residents choose the community with the lowest




Proof. The partial derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to





















The entering childless households prefer to live in the community in which
the gross of tax price is lower because they neither send their child to school
nor bene￿t from the capitalization of public education into the reselling housing
price.
The allocation decisions of households with a child also depend on the edu-
cational expenditure per student Ei
j.
Since 2qN is the number of households entering the area at time 2, and ￿ is
the probability that an entrant has no child, then the number of households with
a child entering the area is (1 ￿ ￿)2qN6. Hence, we can de￿ne the number of
households with a child choosing community b at time 2 as nb
2 = (1 ￿ ￿)2(qN)￿
na
2:
De￿nition 1 shows how the level of educational expenditure per student in
the community a at time 2 (Ea




2 = (1 ￿ ￿)q (2N)












2 = (1 ￿ ￿)2(qN)￿
na
2, there exists a number of households with a child choosing community a at
time 2, denoted by na
2 = n￿ ￿
Ta;Tb￿
, such that Ea
2 R Eb
2 if na










+ (1 ￿ ￿)q (2N)Ta
(Tb + Ta)
(16)
De￿nition 1 helps to compare the indirect utilities that a household with a
child obtain in both the communities. It says that the educational expenditure
per student in each community is decreasing in the number of households with
a child. In particular, for a given number of households with a child remaining
in the community a after the shock ((1 ￿ q)na
1), the higher is the number of
households with a child entering the community a at time 2 lower is the educa-
tional expenditure per student. When na
2 is su¢ ciently small the education per
student in a is higher than the level provided in b.
Furthermore, Lemma 1 completes the De￿nition 1 and shows the e⁄ect that
the number of households with a child remaining in the community a after the
shock has on n￿.
Lemma 1 n￿ is decreasing in the number of households with a child remain-
ing in the community a after the shock, for every q 2 [0;1]
Lemma 1 shows that if a relatively high number of households with a child
remains in the community a after the shock, then it is enough just a small
number of new residents with a child to make the education expenditure per
student in the community a lower than the level provided in the community b.
Formally, the e⁄ect of an increase in (1 ￿ q)na
1 pushes n￿ down and widens the
interval of the values of na
2 such that Ea
2 < Eb
2:
Given de￿nition 1, Proposition 2 de￿nes the equilibrium in the housings
market at time 2.
Proposition 2 When ￿ > 1n2, at time 2 there exists an unique housings
market equilibrium. In this equilibrium pa
2 = pb
2, na
2 = n￿, and both communities
are inhabited by new residents both with and without a child.
Proof. Given the assumption ￿ > 1n2, we proceed by contradiction and sketch




and the housings market is in equilibrium. When pa
2 6= pb
2 the indirect utility
functions of childless household di⁄er between communities, then at least one
childless household has an incentive to chose one community for every na
2 R n￿.
Since ￿ > 1n2, the capacity of each community available at time 2 is not enough
to allocate all childless households, then condition pa
2 6= pb
2 does not characterize




2 > n￿, and the housing market is in equilibrium. From De￿nition 1 we know
11that na
2 > n￿ implies Ea
2 < Eb
2. Therefore, at least one household with a child
has an incentive to go in community b because it would bene￿t more. Hence,
if Ta < Tb and ￿ > 1n2, then pa
2 = pb
2 and na
2 > n￿ do not characterize an




Proposition 2 says that at time 2, if ￿ > 1n2, there exists a unique housings
market equilibrium. In this equilibrium community a and b have the same gross
of tax prices, the same educational expenditure per student and are inhabited
by new residents both with and without a child. In particular, the number of
new residents with a child living in community a is n￿.
Now, given n￿, we are able to de￿ne the educational expenditure per student
provided in the community a at time 2.





be the educational expenditure per
student in the community a when na
2 = n￿. It is de￿ned as follows:
Ea￿























+ (1 ￿ ￿)q (2N)
> 0 (18)
De￿nition 2 shows that the educational expenditure per student increases in
the tax ceteris paribus.
To fully characterize the housing market equilibrium at time 2, we need
to ￿nd the net of tax equilibrium prices. To do that we use the following
assumptions:




z1￿￿ + E (19)
2) The indirect utility of the lowest income household with a child sorting
into community a7 at time 2 is normalized to V .

















7We recall that the community a is assumed to have a lower tax
12p
j











where V 0 = V exp(￿ ￿ 1)






= yc ￿ Ta ￿
V 0 ((1 ￿ q)na
1 + n￿ (:))
TaN
8; (22)
Since proposition 2 shows that in the housing market equilibrium we have
pa
2 = pb
2; then the net of tax housing price a time 2; in the community b; solves
that identity pb
2 = pa






= yc ￿ Tb ￿
V 0 ((1 ￿ q)na
1 + n￿ (:))
TaN
; (23)








































Fig. 4.2 shows the market equilibrium given ￿ > 1n2. The net of tax prices
are pa￿
2 and pb￿
2 , and the number of new residents with a child choosing a is n￿.
Since the gross of tax prices are equal in both community and Ta < Tb,
the net of tax equilibrium price in community a is higher than the net price in
community b.
After an exercise of comparative static on the prices in 24 and 25, we obtain
the following proposition:
Proposition 3



























2 , , n n T T p p T T a a b b a b a = - + = <
i) At time 2, there exists a tax b Ta such that the net of tax equilibrium price
in community a is increasing and concave in Ta for every 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta9.
ii) At time 2, there exists a tax b Tb such that the net of tax equilibrium price
in community b is increasing and concave in Tb for every 0 ￿ Tb < b Tb10.
Proof. We di⁄erentiate 24 with respect to Taand have:
@pa￿
2









+ (1 ￿ ￿)q (2N)
(Tb + Ta)




2 < 0 8Ta;Tb > 0 (27)
Then, we di⁄erentiate 25 with respect to Tb and have:
@pb￿
2









+ (1 ￿ ￿)q (2N)
(Tb + Ta)




2 < 0 8Ta;Tb > 0 (29)





N + (1 ￿ ￿)2V 0q > 0





N + (1 ￿ ￿)2V 0q > 0
14Proposition 3 introduces the capitalization e⁄ect and shows that the level of
tax may be capitalized into the housing prices. In our model there exists a range
of taxes such that the value of the housing, given by its selling price, is increasing
in the tax imposed by the local government to ￿nance public education. In
particular, the higher tax set at time 1 higher is the selling price at time 2.
This implies that for households with a child the marginal bene￿t of a higher
tax runs through the educational expenditure and the reselling price, whereas
childless households only may bene￿t from a higher tax through capitalization.
5.2 Voting at time 1
The aim of this section is ￿nding the optimal tax chosen by a majority voting.
In particular, in the section 5.2.1 we show that the preferences of households
with and without a child may be single peaked. In the section 5.2.2 we show
that a majority voting equilibrium exists and the median income voter may be
pivotal. For the rest of the paper we restrict the analysis on the voting problem
in the community a when the capitalization e⁄ect exists, that is 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta:
A relatively small range of taxes the government allows to vote on is politically
realistic, because it avoids issues of dramatic structural changes that might be
contested by the populations.
5.2.1 Single peaked preferences
In this framework, voting takes place once the households have already bought
the housing, then the housing prices at time 1 are given11. The voters know the
local government￿ s budget constraints and forecast p
j￿
2 and n￿.
Voters in the community a choose the tax Ta maximizing the following
indirect utility functions:
V a





+(1 ￿ q)(v (yc ￿ Ta) + Ea￿




n (Ta;y;q) = v (yn ￿ pa
1 ￿ Ta) + (1 ￿ q)v (yn ￿ Ta) + qv (yn + pa￿
2 ): (31)
Therefore the maximization problems are:
11We do not deal neither with the housing market nor with the allocation choices of house-
holds at time 1. I recall that my model starts when households are already residents with
their own housing.



















+(1 ￿ q)(v (yc ￿ Ta) + Ea￿




T a v (yn ￿ pa
1 ￿ Ta) + (1 ￿ q)v (yn ￿ Ta) + qv (yn + pa￿
2 ) (33)












@Ta qv0 (:) = 0 (34)
￿v0 (:) ￿ (1 ￿ q)v0 (:) +
@pa￿
2
@Ta qv0 (:) = 0 (35)
The second order condition with respect to the tax is satis￿ed for both types
of households; in fact we have:




















Since the indirect utilities 30 and 31 are strictly concave in the range of
taxes we are interested in (that is, 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta), then these utilities reach the
maximum at unique value of the tax. This implies that the preferences of both
households are single peak.
Let Ta￿
c and Ta￿
n be the taxes satisfying the ￿rst order conditions 34 and 35.











Corollary 1 The optimal taxes are such that Ta￿
n < Ta￿









16Proof. Given the ￿rst order condition in 34-35, the assumption v00 (:) < 0 is a
su¢ cient condition for Ta￿
n to be lower than Ta￿
c :
The next proposition enable us to show whether the indirect utility of child-
less households reaches a single peak at a positive tax.






N , when at time 2 the housing price in
community a is increasing in the tax, then there exists a critical value b q such
that the childless household￿ s most preferred tax is unique and positive for every
q > b q, whereas it is never positive for every q ￿ b q.
Proof. The proof proceeds along two steps. In particular, the second step bases
on two Lemmas. Firstly, we show that the slope of the indirect utility function
V a
n (Ta;y) valued at tax Ta su¢ ciently close to b Ta is negative. In the second
step we show that the slope of the indirect utility function V a
n (Ta;y) valued
at Ta
n = 0 is increasing in q, positive for every probability lower than a critical
value b q; and negative for every probability lower than b q. Hence, concavity of
V a
n (Ta;y) over 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta gives the following results: i) when the probability
q is su¢ ciently high, the function V a
n (Ta;y) reaches a unique peak at a positive
tax, ii) when q is su¢ ciently low, the function V a
n (Ta;y) reaches its peak at a
non positive tax .
First step. In this step we show that the slope of the indirect utility
V a
n (Ta;y) as de￿ned in the FOC (35) is negative at Ta su¢ ciently close to b Ta.
Let the slope of V a
n (Ta;y) be de￿ned as follows:
@V a
n (Ta;y)
@Ta = ￿v0 (yn ￿ pa
1 ￿ Ta) ￿ (1 ￿ q)v0 (yn ￿ Ta) +
@pa￿
2
@Ta qv0 (yn + pa￿
2 )




@T a = 0 for Ta = b Ta; therefore there exists an "
su¢ ciently small (" ’ 0) and a level of tax Ta




@T a ’ 0.
Hence, given assumption 1 (implying v0 (:) > 0) and expressions 26 and 27, we
have that the slope of the indirect utility function is negative when Ta = Ta
" .




@T a in 26, we rewrite the slope of the
indirect utility at zero tax as follows:
@V a
n (Ta;y)
@Ta jT a=0= ￿v0 (yn ￿ pa
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(40)






















































Lemma 2 says that the slope of indirect utility function valued at zero tax
is always increasing in the probability of leaving community. Until now, the
condition on (1 ￿ ￿) is a technical assumption employed for exponential conve-
nience.





@T a jT a=0< 0 k
Lemma 3 shows that when the probability of reselling housing is zero, the
slope of the indirect utility function valued at zero tax is negative.
Now from Lemma 2 and 3 we know that there exists a critical positive value
b q such that the slope of the indirect utility is zero when Ta = 0; The critical
value b q is de￿ned as follows:
￿v0 (yn ￿ pa




@Ta jT a=0;q=b q
￿
b qv0 (yn + pa￿
2 jT a=0;q=b q) = 015
(41)










@T a jT a=0> 0 for every
q > b q.
Hence, by concavity of V a
n (Ta;y) over 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta, we conclude the proof
by showing that: i) the indirect utility of childless households is maximized at
negative tax for every q < b q, ii) it reaches a peak at zero tax when q = b q , and
iii) it presents a unique peak at positive tax for every q > b q.
Proposition 4 says that the childless household￿ s most preferred tax is pos-
itive only for su¢ ciently high probability of leaving community and reselling
housing. The reason is that this probability can be considered as the weight
given to the capitalization e⁄ect. When childless household does not leave
community (q = 0), the bene￿t from capitalization disappears, whereas when
households must leave the community for sure, then the bene￿t from the cap-
italization of a higher tax is totally gained. Figure 4.3 illustrates the indirect
utility functions of childless households16.
Given the result in Proposition 4 we are able to show that when the prob-
ability of reselling is su¢ ciently high, then also the most preferred tax of the





























16For exponential convenience we restrict the graphical representation to the case in which
V a
n (Ta;y) is concave even for Ta < 0. Actually, we found concavity only for a positive value
of the tax, nevertheless we remark that the only aim of the ￿gure is showing that when the
probability of leaving community is su¢ ciently low, then there exists at least one peak at a
non positive tax .
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N , when at time 2 the housing price
in community a is increasing in the tax, then the tax most preferred by the
households with a child is unique and positive for every q > b q.
Proof. The ￿rst order conditions 34 and 35 show that the slope of the indirect
utility function of the households with a child with respect to Ta is higher than
the slope of the indirect utility of the childless households. This implies that the
argument of proposition 4 can be also applied to show that the indirect utility
of the households with a child has a single peak at positive tax. Hence, by the
proof of the proposition 4 and the concavity of V a
c (Ta;y) in Ta, we have that
when q ￿ b q and 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta, the indirect utility of households with a child
reaches a single peak at a positive tax.
The concavity of the indirect utility function of both households with and
without a child makes the preferences of all the voters single peaked. This
enables us to characterize the majority voting equilibrium by the median voter
theorem.
5.2.2 The Voting Equilibrium
Now we characterize the voting equilibrium in community a at time 1 and show
whether the median income voter is pivotal. We deal with the interesting case
of N
2 > na
1, that is, the number of childless households living in the community
a is higher than the number of households with a child17.
17Since the number of childless households living into community a at time 1 is N ￿na
1, the
su¢ cient condition for the childless households to be more than the households with a child
19To show whether the median income voter is pivotal we ￿rstly need to see how
the level of income drives the voting behavior of households. To do that we need
the sign of the cross derivative of the indirect utility with respect to the income




@y@T a ; with i = c;n. According to the standard theory









@y@T a < 0) the utility of higher income households increases more when
the tax is higher (lower), then higher income households prefer higher (lower)
tax.
Hence, by di⁄erentiate the indirect utility Vi (Ta;y;q) with respect to yi and
Ta we obtain:
@2Vi (Ta;y;q)
@y@Ta = ￿v00 ￿
yi ￿ pa
1 ￿ Ta￿









It is possible to see that for the households both with and without a child
the sign of 42 is ambiguous and depends on q and Ta.
The following proposition provides the conditions such that the sign of 42 is
not ambiguous, then we are able to study the e⁄ect of household income on the
voting behavior.
Proposition 6 There exists a strictly increasing function de￿ned over 0 ￿
Ta < b Ta, denoted by e q (Ta), and de￿ned the indi⁄erence locus, such that a high
income household with and without a child prefers higher tax if and only if the
probability of reselling housing is lower than e q (Ta).
Proof. A high income household is indi⁄erent between preferring high or low
tax if:
@2Vi (Ta;y;q)
@y@Ta = 0 (43)





@y@T a is decreasing in q for every 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta: k
Lemma 4 shows that there exists a unique value of q 2 [0;1] which solves the 42
for any 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta:This required value is e q (Ta), it is called indi⁄erence locus
is N ￿ na
1 > N
2 , that can be written as na
1 < N
2 : Furthermore, we stress that na
1 < N
2 is a




N to be satis￿ed, therefore na
1 < N
2 is also
a necessary condition for proposition 4 to hold.
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N . Figure 4.4 19 illustrates the indi⁄erence locus e q (Ta) 20:











@y@T a < 0 for every q > e q (Ta):
The result in proposition 6 implies that the indirect utility functions of both
households with and without a child evaluated at di⁄erent level of taxes cross at
most once in the plane (U;y). In particular, for su¢ ciently high probability the
utility with higher tax cross the other from above, whereas for su¢ ciently low
probability the utility with higher tax cross the other from below. The ￿g. 4.4
illustrates that for any given probability, high income households prefer higher
tax only when they are allowed to choose within a range of taxes su¢ ciently high.
When the households can choose only within a range of taxes relatively low, then
high income households prefer higher tax only if the probability of reselling
housing is su¢ ciently low. This result is in line with Kenny (1978), Denzau
and Grier (1984), Fischer (1988) and Epple and Romano (1996) according to
which high income households are more willing to bear a tax rise for increased
public education21. My results also show that when the voting is over a range
of taxes relatively low and the probability of reselling the housing is high, then



































19In the ￿g. 4.4 we draw the indi⁄erence locus as convex function in Ta. Actually, we do
not show that the indi⁄erence locus is convex in Ta because it would imply a lot of complex
computations. By deriving the 44 with respect to Ta we would ￿nd whether the the slope
of the indi⁄erence locus increases in the tax or not. Moreover, even though the indi⁄erence
locus was concave, the qualitative results providing by the ￿gure would not change.
20From 44 it is possible to see that when the value of the tax is su¢ ciently close to b Ta, then
@2Vi(Ta;y;q)
@y@Ta > 0 for every 0 ￿ q ￿ 1. This implies that the indi⁄erence locus does not cross
the vertical line at b Ta. Moreover, by looking at the expression 44, it is also possible to see
that when the probability is su¢ ciently close to zero, then we have
@2Vi(Ta;y;q)
@y@Ta jq=0> 0 for
every 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta. This implies that the indi⁄erence locus has positive value when Ta = 0,
that is e q (0) > 0 .
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Fig. 4.4 The indifference locus
low income households prefer higher tax. Hence, the higher the weight given in
the utility function to the future capitalization e⁄ect (higher q) lower will be
the willingness of high income households to bear a tax rise for increased public
education today.
The following corollary completes the proposition 6 and helps to study the
voting behavior when the most preferred tax of households both with and with-
out a child is positive.






N , when q > b q; then high income house-
hold with and without a child prefers higher positive tax if and only if the prob-
ability of reselling housing is lower than e q (Ta).
Proof. The proof comes from the result of proposition 4, 5 and 6.
Corollary 2 helps to better explain the voting behavior of the childless house-
holds by using the indi⁄erence locus. It con￿rms that for every given level of
probability such that all households prefer positive tax, high income childless
households prefer higher tax only when they are allowed to choose within a
range of taxes su¢ ciently high.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the voting behavior when q > b q, assuming that b q >
e q (0): When q > e q (Ta) and q > b q (the dotted area), then high income childless
households prefer lower tax, whereas when q < e q (Ta) and q > b q (the dashed
area), then high income childless households prefer higher tax. Hence, high
income on the willingness to bear such a rise tax is still controversial and, for this reason,
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income childless households are more willing to bear a tax rise for increased
public education only because of the capitalization e⁄ect. In particular, when
the weight (q) given to the capitalization e⁄ect is su¢ ciently high, then high
income childless households are more willing to bear a tax rise only when they
are allowed to vote within a range of taxes su¢ ciently high. The same analysis
can be applied to the case b q < e q (0) and q > b q
By summarizing, with Proposition 6 and Corollary 2 I show that for whatever
weight given to the capitalization e⁄ect (or equivalently for every probability of
reselling the housing), when voters are allowed to choose within a range of tax
su¢ ciently high, then only high income voters are willing to bear a tax rise for
increased public education.
The behavior of households given in Proposition 6 and Corollary 1 enable
us to characterize the voting equilibrium and check whether the median income
is pivotal.
De￿nition 3 Let y be the income such that F (y) = N





be respectively the preferred tax by the voter with and without a child whose
income is y.
Now we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Given ￿ > 1n2 , when N
2 > na
1 a majority voting equilibrium
in the community a at time 1 exists and the income of median voter is di⁄erent
from the median income for every q 2 [0;1].
23Proof. We focus on the community a, but without loss of generality the proof
holds also for the community b. We proceed by dividing the rest of the proof in
three steps. Since the indirect utilities of voters both with and without a child
reach a unique peak then the preferences of all voters over the tax 0 ￿ Ta < b Ta
are single peaked. Consequently, by the median voter theorem (Black, 1958),
a unique majority votig equilibrium exists and the median voter is pivotal. In
the following steps we show that the median voter has income di⁄erent from the
median income.
i) Consider the scenario with N
2 > na
1, b q < q < e q (Ta), such that both
households vote for a positive tax, and higher income households prefer a higher
tax. We following Epple and Romano (1996) and show that the median income




be the median-income voter￿ s indirect utility
function. We procede by showing that Tc and Tn can not characterize a majority
voting equilibrium because there existes a coalition composed of at least half
the households preferring a di⁄erent tax.
Lemma 5 When b q < q < e q (Ta), Tn is also the most preferred tax by the
voters with a child whose income e yc < y, and Tc is also the most preferred tax by the
childless voters with income e yn > y k
Consider Tn, Proposition 6 and Corollary 1 imply that childless voters with
income y ￿ y and voters with a child and income y ￿ e ycprefer a tax Ta > Tn.
Since y is the median-income, then at least half the voters prefers a tax Ta > Tn.
Consider Tc, Proposition 6, Corollary 1 and lemma 5 imply that voters with
a child whose income is y ￿ y and childless voters with income y ￿ e yc prefer a
tax Ta < Tc. Since y is the median-income, then at least half the voters prefers
a tax Ta < Tc.
ii) Consider the scenario with N
2 > na
1, b q < q and q > e q (Ta), such that both
households vote for a positive tax, and higher income households prefer a lower
tax. We follow the case i) and show that the median voter￿ s income is di⁄erent
from the median income.
Lemma 6 When b q < q and q > e q (Ta), then Tn is also the most preferred tax
by the voters with a child whose income is e yc > y, and Tc is also the most preferred
tax by the the childless voter with income is e yn < y: k
Consider Tn, Proposition 6 and Corollary 1 imply that childless voters with
income y ￿ y and voters with a child and income y ￿ e ycprefer a tax Ta > Tn.
Since y is the median-income, then at least half the voters prefers a tax Ta > Tn.
Consider Tc, Proposition 6, Corollary 1 and Lemma 6 imply that voters with
a child whose income is y ￿ y and childless voters with income y ￿ e yc prefer a
tax Ta < Tc. Since y is the median-income, then at least half the voters prefers
a tax Ta < Tc.
iii) Consider the scenario N
2 > na
1 and q ￿ b q. In this case, all childless
households vote for zero tax, then there will be always a coalition of childless
households composed of more than half the population of community a blocking
any proposed positive tax. Hence, a majority voting exists, but the median
24voter￿ s income is di⁄erent from the median income.
Hence, steps (i), (ii) and (iii) show that the tax most preferred by the voter
with the median income does not characterize a majority voting equilibrium.
Proposition 7 says that when at time 1 the community a is inhabited by a
majority of childless households, then a majority voting equilibrium exists only
if the probability of reselling housing is su¢ ciently high. In this equilibrium the
median voter￿ s income is di⁄erent from the media income. When the probability
of reselling housing is su¢ ciently low, most of the population in the community
would prefer zero tax, then a majority voting still exists but and the median
voter still has income di⁄erent from the median income.
In our model the expenditure in education is capitalized into the housing
price, that is, the higher tax higher is the reselling housing price. When the
probability of leaving the community is high, then the bene￿t from higher tax
capitalized into the housing price is su¢ ciently high to allow childless house-
holds to prefer positive tax even though they do not have school aged children.
When the probability of leaving is low, then the marginal cost from reducing
consumption overcomes the marginal bene￿t from higher reselling price, then
childless households do not vote for a positive tax.
The probability of leaving may help to dicriminate households according to
the age of the members. The young households may be characterized by higher
probability of changing location over time, whereas elderly may be considered
less willing then young to leave their own housing22. Hence, the results of this
model would show that only for young childless households the capitalization
e⁄ect may be a su¢ cent condition to support local public spending in education.
22Frenette, Picot and Sceviour (2004) ￿nd that older households are more likely than young
households to spend long time in low income neighborhoods
256 Conclusion
Empirical evidence and theoretical studies show that when a local government
￿nances the local provision of public education by a tax set by a majority voting,
then homeowner households with school aged children support local spending
for two main reasons: children bene￿t from a higher provision of education,
and a higher public spending in education is capitalized into the value of the
housing. In this context, capitalization means that the higher is the provision
of local public education higher is the value of the housing.
Empirical evidence ￿nds that even childless households support local public
spending in education. Most of this literature explains this result with the
capitalization e⁄ect.
The current theorethical model shows that the capitalization e⁄ect may not
be a su¢ cient condition for the childless households to support local public
spending in education.
I study a two period model composed of a metropolitan area diveded in two
communities. Households living in the metropolitan area may or not have a
child. Each local government provides public education by a tax imposed on
the residents. At the beginning of the ￿rst period, households vote on the tax
and the child, if any, goes to school. The voting takes place only once, therefore
the tax remains ￿xed over the two periods. In the second period, with a certain
probability households must sell their housing and emigrate in another area.
New residents move into the metropolitan area, buy a housing from the leaving
households and sort into communities. The new entrants cannot modify the local
provision of education. Following Brueckner and Joo (1991) the capitalization
e⁄ect employed in the current model leans on the relation between the tax and
the reselling housing price: the higher is the tax set in the ￿rst period higher
will be the resilling housing price in the second period.
My result crucially depends on the probability of leaving the community.
Childless households vote for a positive tax only for a su¢ ciently high proba-
bility of leaving.
The presence of the childless households di⁄erentiates my model from the
previous theoretical literature which analyzes only the behavior of households
with children. Furthermore, the introduction of the probability of leaving may
help to di⁄erentiate old (whose probability could be su¢ ciently low) from young
childless households (whose probability could be assumed su¢ cently high). In
this sense, my result may show that only for young childless households the cap-
italization e⁄ect may be a su¢ cient condition to support local public spending
in education.
The current model tries to provide a theoretical base to the empirical lit-
erature con￿rming that the childless households support local public spending
in education. This work stresses the necessity of introducing childless voters in
a multy community model in which the local public education is ￿nanced by a
tax set by a majority voting.
26The qualitative result of this model depends on the channels the capitaliza-
tion e⁄ect runs through. Further reserach could model the capitalization e⁄ect
by allowing some externality, such as rich people with no children preferring to
live near rich people who, if they have children vote for high tax.
277 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1, 2, 3, and 4 are just ￿rst and second derivatives.
Proof of Lemma 1
Let ￿ = (1 ￿ q)na
1 be the number of households with a child remaining in








Proof of Lemma 2
The cross derivative of the function V a
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Now, the second derivative of the slope of the indirect utility function with
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28Proof of Lemma 3
Since the slope of the indirect utility function of childless households with
respect to Ta, valued at Ta = 0 is:
@V a
n (Ta;y)
@Ta jT a=0= ￿v0 (yn ￿ pa
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(51)
then for q = 0, we have:
@V a
n (Ta;y)
@Ta jT a=0= ￿v0 (yn ￿ pa
1) ￿ v0 (yn) < 0 (52)
￿
Proof of Lemma 4.
The cross derivative of the indirect utility function of households both with
and without a child with respect to the income and the tax is given by:
@2Vi (Ta;y)
@y@Ta = ￿v00 ￿
yi ￿ pa
1 ￿ Ta￿
￿(1 ￿ q)v00 ￿
yi ￿ Ta￿

































































2 = v000 ￿
yi ￿ pa
1 ￿ Ta￿
























@T a2 < 0 is always positive.
￿
Proof of Lemma 5
Proposition 6 implies that when b q < q < e q (Ta) the optimal tax of both
voters with and without a child is increasing in income. Since Corollary 1
implies that Tc > Tn, then there exists: i) an income e yn higher than y such
that childless voters with income e yn prefer Tn = Tc, and ii) an income e yc lower
than y such that voters with a child and income e yc Tc = Tn.INSERT GRAPH
￿
29Proof of Lemma 6
Assuming b q < q and q > e q (Ta), the proof follows the proof of Lemma 5.
￿
30References
[1] Alesina, A., Baqir, R., Easterly W., 1999. Public Goods and Ethnic Divi-
sions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 1243-84.
[2] Baldson, E., Brunner, E., 2003. Intergeneraltional Con￿ ict nad the Po-
litical Economy of School Spending Working Paper n. 24. Department of
Economics, University of Connecticut.
[3] Black, D., 1958. Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge.
[4] Benson, C.S., O￿ Halloran, K. 1987. The Economic History of School Fi-
nance in the United States. Journal of Education Finance 13, 495-515.
[5] Bergstrom, T. C., Rubinfeld, D. L., Shapiro, P., 1982. Micro-Based Esti-
mates of Demand Functions for Local School Expenditures. Econometrica
50, 1183-1205.
[6] Brueckner, J.K., Joo, M.S., 1991. Voting with capitalization. Regional Sci-
ence and Urban Economics 21, 453￿ 469.
[7] Cutler, D. M., Elmendorf, D.W., Zeckhauser, R.J., 1993. Demographic
Characteristics and the Public Bundle. Public Finance 48, 178-98.
[8] Denzau, A.T., Grier, K., 1984. Determinants of Local School Spending:
Some Consistent Estimates. Public Choice, 375-383.
[9] Epple, D., 2003. Modeling population strati￿cation across locations: an
overview. Internetaional regional science revoew, vol. 26, No. 2
[10] Epple, D., Romano, R., E., 1996. Ends Against the Middle: determing pub-
lic service provision when there are private alternatives. Journal of Public
Economics., vol. 62, 297-325
[11] Epple, D., Romano, R., E., 1996. Public provision of private good. The
Journal of Political Economy, Vol 104, n 1. 57-84
[12] Epple, D., Romano, R., E.., Romer, T.., 1993. Existence of voting and
housing equilibrium in a system of community with a property tax. Regional
Science and Urban Economics. Vol 23. 585-610.
[13] Fischel, W., A., 1998. School ￿nance litigation and property tax revolts:
how undermining local control turns voters away from public education.
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy working paper.
[14] Fischel, W., A., 2001. The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values In
uence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
31[15] Fisher, R.C., 1988. State and Local Public Finance. Scott Foresman & Co
Press.
[16] Francisco, M.M., 2006. The Existence of Non-Elite Private Schools. Forth-
coming in Journal of Public Economics.
[17] Francisco, M.M., 2004. The impact of ￿scal decentralization on income
segregation. Working Paper E2004/68. Fundaci￿n centrA
[18] Frenette, M., Picot, G., Sceviour, R., 2004. How long do people live in low-
income neighbourhoods? Evidence for Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.
Ottawa, Canada: Statistics Canada; 2004.
[19] Goldin, C., Katz, L., 1997. Why the United States Led in Education:
Lessons From Secondary School Expansion, 1910 to 1940. NBER Work-
ing Paper No. 6144, August.
[20] Goldin, C., Katz, L., 1999. Human Capital and Social Capital: The Rise of
Secondary Schooling in America, 1910 to 1940. Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 29:683-723.
[21] Hamilton, B.W., 1979. Capitalization and the Regressivity of the Property
Tax: Empirical Evidence. National Tax Journal 32, 169-180.
[22] Harris, A. R., Evans, W. N., Schwab, R. M., 2001. Education Spending in
an Aging America. Journal of Public Economics 81, 449-472.
[23] Heinberg, J., Oates, W., 1970. The Incidence of Di⁄erential Property Taxes
on Urban Housing: A Comment and Some Further Evidence. National Tax
Journal, vol 3, 92-98
[24] Hilbert, C.A.L., Mayer, C. 2004. Why Do Households without Children
Support Local Public Schools? NBER Working Paper No. W10804
[25] Hoxby, C.M., 2000. Does competition among public schools bene￿t students
and taxpayere?. The American Economic Review, Vol 90, n. 5.
[26] Hoxby, Caroline M. ￿How Much Does School Spending Depend on Family
Income? The Historical Origins of the Current School Finance Dilemma.￿
American Economic Review 88 (May 1998b): 309-320.
[27] Nechyba, T., 2003. School ￿nance, spatial income segregation, and the
nature of communities. Journal of Urban Economics, vol 54, no. 1, pp 61-
88
[28] Oates, W.E., 1969. The e⁄ect of property tax on local public spending on
property values: an empirical study of tax capitalization and the tiebout
hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 77, n 6, pp 957-971
[29] Orr, L.L., 1968. The Incidence of Di⁄erential Property Taxes on Urban
Housing. National Tax Journal 21, 253-262.
32[30] Yinger, J., Howard S.B., Borsch-Supan,A., Helen F. L., 1988. Property
Taxes and Housing Values: The Theory and Estimation of Intrajurisdic-
tional Property Tax Capitalization. Boston: Academic Press.
[31] Yinger, J., 1982. Capitalization and the theory of local public ￿nance. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 90, 917￿ 943.
[32] Yinger, J., 1981. Capitalization and the median voter. The American Eco-
nomic Review, vol 71, n.2, pp 99-103
[33] Rothstein, G., 2005. Does competition among public schools bene￿t stu-
dents and taxpayere? A comment on Hoxby (2000). NBER Working Paper
11215.
[34] Sasaki, K., 2000. Local public goods and the capital-gain e⁄ects. Regional
Science and Urban Economics 30, 45-57.
[35] Sims, R.G., 2004. School funding, taxes and economic growth: An analysis
of the 50 states. Nea reserach working paper.
[36] Sonstelie, J.C., Portney, P.R., 1980. Gross Rents and Market Values: Test-
ing the Implications of Tiebout￿ s Hypothesis. Journal of Urban Economics
7, 102-118.
[37] Tiebout, C., 1956. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of Po-
litical Economy, vol. 64, n 5.
33